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TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF HYBRIDITY
Paul Schiff Berman*
INTRODUCTION
Debates about non-state normative communities often devolve into clashes
between two polarized positions. On the one hand, we see the desire to eradicate
difference through forced obeisance to a single overarching state norm. On the
other, we see claims of complete autonomy for non-state lawmaking, as if such
non-state communities could plausibly exist in isolation from the communities that
both surround and intersect them.
Neither of these positions takes seriously the importance of engagement and
dialogue across difference. Navigating difference doesn’t require either
assimilation or separation; it requires negotiation. Legal pluralists have long
charted this process of negotiation,1 noting, for example, that colonial legal
*

© 2010 Paul Schiff Berman, Dean and Foundation Professor of Law, Sandra Day
O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. This Essay is based on a presentation
delivered at the Non-State Governance Symposium, held at the University of Utah in
February 2009. I am grateful to participants in that symposium for useful comments and
suggestions. Portions of this Essay have appeared in Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal
Pluralism, 5 ANNUAL REV. OF L. & SOC. SCIENCE 225 (2009); Paul Schiff Berman,
Federalism and International Law Through the Lens of Legal Pluralism, 73 MO. L. REV.
1151 (2008); Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007);
and Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 311
(2002). For a video of the author’s remarks at the Non-State Governance Symposium, visit
http://www.ulaw.tv/watch/631/non-state-governance-symposium-paul-berman.
1
See, e.g., Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World: An Introductory Guide to
Classifications, Typological Interpretations, and Bibliographical Resources, in LAW AND
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 11, 15 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (“[N]ot all the
phenomena related to law and not all that are lawlike have their source in government.”).
For further discussions of legal pluralism, see generally BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS,
TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 85–
98 (2d ed. 2002); CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
AND THE STATE (2002); Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47
J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 37 (2002); Keebet von Benda-Beckmann,
Transnational Dimensions of Legal Pluralism, in BEGEGNUNG UND KONFLIKT EINE
KULTURANTHROPOLOGISCHE BESTANDSAUFNAHME 33 (2001); David M. Engel, Legal
Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives on a Civil Trial Court, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 425; Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and
Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 27–34 (1981); John Griffiths, What Is Legal
Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986); LAW AND GLOBALIZATION
FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Boaventura de Sousa Santos &
César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005); Sally Engle Merry, International Law and
Sociolegal Scholarship: Toward a Spatial Global Legal Pluralism, 41 STUD. IN L., POL. &
SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 149 (2008); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y
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systems did not eradicate indigenous systems (even when they tried to).2 Instead,
there was a layering and intermingling of systems. And, just as important, actors
strategically used the variety of fora to gain leverage and make their voices heard.
But legal pluralists have usually stopped at the descriptive. Thus, while they
have catalogued the myriad ways in which state and non-state lawmaking interact,
they have not taken the next step and attempted to articulate the normative
jurisprudence that might flow from these observations. After all, it is one thing to
say that as a descriptive matter interactions among legal and quasi-legal systems
operating in the same social field inevitably occur; it is quite another to argue (as I
will attempt to do here) that such messy interactivity is actually a potentially
desirable feature to build into legal and political systems.
I call this messy interactivity a jurisprudence of hybridity, and I argue that
such a jurisprudence may actually be preferable to either a hierarchical
jurisprudence whereby the hegemonic state imposes a universal norm, or a
separatist jurisprudence whereby non-state communities attempt to maintain
complete autonomy.3 Why do I prefer a jurisprudence of hybridity? First, such a
jurisprudence acknowledges the reality that people hold multiple community
affiliations, rather than dissolving that multiplicity into either universality or
separatism. Second, developing procedural mechanisms, institutions, or discursive
practices that acknowledge hybridity helps to ensure that multiple communities are
at least taken seriously and given a voice. Third, providing space for multiple
communities may result in better substantive decisions because there is more space
for variations and experimentation.4
REV. 869, 870 (1988); Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous
Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973);
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role of Law in Counter-hegemonic Globalization and Global
Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle in India, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L
L. 345 (2005); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. &
SOC’Y 296 (2000); Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World
Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
2
See, e.g., Leopold Pospisil, Modern and Traditional Administration of Justice in
New Guinea, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 93 (1981) (examining the change from a traditional
to a modern legal system in New Guinea).
3
This is a position I advance at greater length in Paul S. Berman, Global Legal
Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007).
4
In focusing on the pluralist opportunities inherent in jurisdictional redundancy, I
echo the insights of Robert Cover. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional
Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).
Although his essay was focused particularly on the variety of official law pronouncers in
the U.S. federal system, Cover celebrated the benefits that accrue from having multiple
overlapping jurisdictional assertions. Such benefits included greater possibility for error
correction, a more robust field for norm articulation, and a larger space for creative
innovation. And though Cover acknowledged that it might seem perverse “to seek out a
messy and indeterminate end to conflicts which may be tied neatly together by a single
authoritative verdict,” he nevertheless argued that we should “embrace” a “system that
permits tensions and conflicts of the social order” to be played out in the jurisdictional
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Of course, acknowledging non-state community affiliations does not
necessarily mean that they are the same as state communities. Most important,
states usually (though not always) possess greater access to coercive power such as
armies, police officers, and the like. Thus, it will often be agents of the state who
determine the parameters of accommodation to non-state norms, so one should not
naively assume that there is no hierarchy here.
Moreover, building mechanisms for acknowledging and accommodating
multiple community affiliations does not mean states should always defer to those
communities. For example, some community norms are sufficiently repressive,
violent, and/or profoundly illiberal that they might not be followed. I argue here
only that such norms should be considered, not that they should always win. But if
they are considered, then when a decision maker refuses to defer, that decision
maker will at least be required to justify why deference is impossible. As we will
see, requiring such justifications acknowledges and respects community norms
even when they don’t win and forces the decision maker to offer a compelling
justification on the other side of the ledger to explain why deference is impossible.
It seems to me that this process of acknowledgment and justification is a good
thing.
In this Essay, I start by referencing work of sociologists and political theorists
analyzing interpersonal and societal communication, and I contrast a vision
whereby difference is overcome by assuming commonality with one in which
“otherness” is seen as an inevitable part of human interaction. I argue that it is
unwise to attempt to “overcome” difference by trying to forge sameness. Yet, it is
equally unwise, in a globally integrated world, to expect that walls of separation
(either literal or conceptual) will be effective. Thus, we should aspire to a state of
unassimilated otherness in an integrated community. In such a state, we seek
communication across difference rather than annihilation of difference.
Then, I turn to law and survey three different procedural mechanisms that are
or could be examples of a jurisprudence of hybridity with regard to non-state
communities. First, I examine the idea of building margins of appreciation into
constitutional jurisprudence to allow some scope for local and non-state
community variation. Second, I explore the possibility that limited autonomy or
participation regimes can help ensure some scope for non-state norms. And third, I
suggest that thinking of non-state norms through the prism of conflict of laws
doctrines—jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments—might be
preferable to the more mechanistic ways in which clashes between state and nonstate norms are often judged.
The excruciatingly difficult case-by-case questions concerning how much to
defer and how much to impose are probably impossible to answer definitively and
are, at any rate, beyond the scope of this Essay. The crucial antecedent point,
however, is that although people may never reach agreement on norms, they may
structure of the system. Id. at 682. Thus, Cover’s pluralism, though here focused on U.S.
federalism, can be said to include the creative possibilities inherent in multiple overlapping
jurisdictions asserted by both state and non-state entities in whatever context they arise.
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at least acquiesce in procedures, institutions, or practices that take hybridity
seriously, rather than ignoring it through assertions of either universalist state
imperatives or inflexible conceptions of non-state autonomy. A jurisprudence of
hybridity, in contrast, seeks to preserve the spaces of opportunity for contestation
and local variation that legal pluralists have long documented, and therefore a
focus on hybridity may at times be both normatively preferable and more practical
precisely because agreement on substantive norms is so difficult. And again, the
claim is only that the independent values of pluralism should always be factored
into the analysis, not that they should never be trumped by other considerations.
Of course, one thing that a jurisprudence of hybridity will not do is provide an
authoritative metric for determining which norms should prevail in this messy
hybrid world. Nor does it answer the question of who gets to decide. Indeed,
pluralism fundamentally challenges both the positivist and natural rights-based
assumption that there can ever be a single answer to such questions. For example,
as noted previously, the state’s efforts to squelch a non-state community are likely
only to be partial, so the state’s assertion of its own trumping authority is not the
end of the debate, but only one gambit in an ongoing normative discourse that has
no final resolution.5 Likewise, there is no external position from which one could
make a definitive statement as to who is authorized to make decisions in any given
case. Rather, a statement of authority is itself inevitably open to contest. Power
disparities matter, of course, and those who wield coercive force may be able to
silence competing voices for a time. But even that sort of temporary silencing is
rarely the end of the story, either. Thus, instead of the unitary answers assumed by
universalism and separatism, a jurisprudence of hybridity is a “jurisgenerative”
model6 focusing on the creative interventions offered by various normative
communities, drawing on a variety of normative sources in ongoing political,
rhetorical, and legal iterations.7
At the same time, mechanisms, institutions, and practices of the sort discussed
in this Essay require actors to at least be willing to take part in a common set of
discursive forms. This is not as idealistic as it may at first appear. Indeed, as
5

Lauren Benton, Making Order out of Trouble: Jurisdictional Politics in the Spanish
Colonial Borderlands, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 373, 375–76 (2001) (describing jurisdictional
politics in seventeenth-century New Mexico and observing that, while “the crown made
aggressive claims that royal authority and state law superseded other legal authorities,” in
reality, “[j]urisdictional disputes became not just commonplace but a defining feature of
the legal order”).
6
See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term–Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–15 (1983).
7
Cf. SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 49 (2006) (“Whereas natural
right philosophies assume that the principles that undergird democratic politics are
impervious to transformative acts of popular collective will, and whereas legal positivism
identifies democratic legitimacy with the correctly generated legal norms of a sovereign
legislature, jurisgenerative politics is a model that permits us to think of creative
interventions that mediate between universal norms and the will of democratic
majorities.”).
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Jeremy Waldron has argued, “[t]he difficulties of inter-cultural or religious-secular
dialogue are often exaggerated when we talk about the incommensurability of
cultural frameworks and the impossibility of conversation without a common
conceptual scheme. In fact, conversation between members of different cultural
and religious communities is seldom a dialogue of the deaf . . . .”8 Nevertheless, it
is certainly true that some normative systems deny even this limited goal of mutual
dialogue. Such systems would (correctly) recognize the liberal bias within the
hybrid vision I explore here, and they may reject the vision on that basis. For
example, although abortion rights and antiabortion activists could, despite their
differences, be said to share a willingness to engage in a common practice of
constitutional adjudication, those bombing abortion clinics are not similarly
willing; accordingly, there may not be any way to accommodate such actors even
within a more pluralist, hybrid framework. Likewise, communities that refuse to
allow even the participation of particular subgroups, such as women or minorities,
may be difficult to include within the pluralist vision I have in mind. Of course,
these groups are undeniably important forces to recognize and take account of as a
descriptive matter. But from a normative perspective, an embrace of a
jurisprudence of hybridity need not commit one to a worldview free from
judgment, where all positions are equivalently embraced. Thus, I argue not
necessarily for undifferentiated inclusion, but for a set of procedural mechanisms,
institutions, and practices that are more likely to expand the range of voices heard
or considered, thereby creating more opportunities to forge a common social space
than either statism or separatism.9
I. SELF, OTHER, AND THE NEGOTIATION OF DIFFERENCE
Sociological studies of communication often start from the idea that
interpersonal interaction requires both parties in an encounter to believe (or at least
assume) that the other is not truly other at all.10 According to this view, most
associated with Alfred Schutz,11 differences in individual perspectives are
overcome only if each party tacitly believes that he/she could effectively trade
places with the other. As Schutz describes it, “I am able to understand other
8

Jeremy Waldron, Public Reason and “Justification” in the Courtroom, 1 J.L., PHIL.
& CULTURE 107, 112 (2007).
9
This focus on jurisgenerative structures, rather than on the necessary inclusion of,
or deference to, all points of view, may differentiate a jurisprudence of hybridity from
multiculturalism.
10
My discussion here relies heavily on Z.D. Gurevitch, The Other Side of Dialogue:
On Making the Other Strange and the Experience of Otherness, 93 AM. J. SOC. 1179
(1988).
11
See generally ALFRED SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS
(Helmut R. Wagner ed., 1970) [hereinafter SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY]; ALFRED
SCHUTZ, COLLECTED PAPERS I: THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL REALITY (Maurice Natanson ed.,
4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter SCHUTZ, PROBLEM]; Alfred Schutz, The Stranger: An Essay in
Social Psychology, 49 AM. J. SOC. 499 (1944).
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people’s acts only if I can imagine that I myself would perform analogous acts if I
were in the same situation . . . .”12 Thus, differences in perspective are reduced to
differences in situation. Any possibly more fundamental differences are suppressed
to facilitate dialogue.
As a result, the deliberate “assuming away” of the unfamiliar is seen as a
constant part of everyday life. The unfamiliar is relegated to the category of
“strange,” and “strangeness” necessarily is placed elsewhere, somewhere other
than the interaction at hand.13 Moreover, Harold Garfinkel and other
ethnomethodologists have argued that individuals do not simply passively maintain
these assumptions, but are constantly engaged in a joint enterprise aimed at
sustaining this familiarity.14 In all of these studies, the emphasis is on “the human
production of common worlds of meaning as the only axis on which dialogue
rotates.”15
But is that all there is to the experience of the other? Is it really imperative
constantly to assume that our fellow human beings are fundamentally identical to
us? After all, as Z.D. Gurevitch has argued, “[u]nder this principle, if a dialogue is
to take place, strangeness as a phenomenon of everyday interaction must be
considered negatively, namely, as that part of an encounter that must be constantly
‘assumed away’ by the participants.”16 Thus, we are left with a world in which
people are classified either as familiar or as strangers. And, even more
problematic, these studies suggest that it will be simply impossible to bridge the
communication gap with those deemed strangers. Yet, as Georg Simmel noted
long ago, the stranger is never truly distant,17 so there will need to be some way of
bridging gaps short of assuming away strangeness altogether.
To seek an alternative formulation, we might turn to political philosophy.
Hannah Arendt, for example, offers a different way of conceptualizing the
encounter with the stranger. Instead of assuming commonality, she seeks, in
“Understanding and Politics,” the quality that “makes it bearable to live with other
people, strangers forever, in the same world, and makes it possible for them to bear
with us.”18 Note that for Arendt the task is how to “bear with” strangers, even

12

SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 11, at 181.
See Gurevitch, supra note 10, at 1180 (summarizing arguments in SCHUTZ,
PROBLEM, supra note 11).
14
See Harold Garfinkel, Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities, in
STUDIES IN SOCIAL INTERACTION 1, 3 (David Sudnow ed., 1972).
15
Gurevitch, supra note 10, at 1180.
16
Id. at 1181–82.
17
See GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 402–08 (Kurt H. Wolff
ed. & trans., 1950) (describing the phenomenon of how a stranger, who appears distant, is
actually very near).
18
HANNAH ARENDT, Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding),
in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING 307, 322 (Jerome Kohn ed., 1994).
13
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while recognizing that they will forever be strange.19 Significantly, this task is very
different from the more intimate communication relationships studied in the
sociological literature discussed above. After all, if strangers are “forever strange,”
their strangeness cannot be overcome through psychological assumptions; a
different strategy is necessary.
Arendt’s strategy for bearing with strangers is more than just mutual
indifference and more than just toleration. It “involves a mental capacity
appropriate for an active relation to that which is distant,”20 which Arendt locates
in King Solomon’s gift of the “understanding heart.”21 Understanding, according to
Arendt, “is the specifically human way of being alive; for every single person
needs to be reconciled to a world into which he was born a stranger and in which,
to the extent of his distinct uniqueness, he always remains a stranger.”22 And what
does “understanding” entail for Arendt? This is a bit difficult to pin down, but she
makes clear that it is not gained through direct experience of the other, and it is not
just knowledge of the other.23 Instead, understanding starts from the individual
situated apart from others. Thus, instead of “feeling your pain,” understanding
involves determining what aspects of the pain people feel has to do with politics,
and what politics can do to resolve our common dilemmas. Moreover,
“[u]nderstanding can be challenged and is compelled to respond to an alternative
argument or interpretation.”24 In short, understanding in Arendt’s formulation
looks a lot less like empathy and a lot more like judging.25
This more distanced conception of the encounter with the stranger appears to
have something in common with Iris M. Young’s vision of “unassimilated
otherness,” which she posits as the relation among people in the ideal
“unoppressive city.”26 Young envisions ideal city life as the “‘being-together’ of
strangers.”27 These strangers may remain strangers and continue to “experience
each other as other.”28 Indeed, they do not necessarily seek an overall group
identification and loyalty. Yet, they are open to “unassimilated otherness.”29 They
belong to various distinct groups or cultures and are constantly interacting with
19

In focusing on Arendt’s idea of “bearing with strangers,” I draw from the analysis
in Phillip Hansen, Hannah Arendt and Bearing with Strangers, 3 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY
3 (2004).
20
Id. at 3.
21
ARENDT, supra note 18, at 322.
22
Id. at 308.
23
See id. at 313.
24
Jean Bethke Elshtain, Judging Rightly, FIRST THINGS 49, 49 (November 1994)
(reviewing ARENDT, supra note 18).
25
See ARENDT, supra note 18, at 313.
26
See Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, 12
SOC. THEORY & PRACTICE 1, reprinted in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 300, 317, 319
(Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990) (“Our political ideal is the unoppressive city.”).
27
Id. at 318.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 319.
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other groups. But they do so without seeking either to assimilate or to reject those
others. Such interactions instantiate an alternative kind of community,30 one that is
never a hegemonic imposition of sameness but that nevertheless prevents different
groups from ever being completely outside one another.31 In a city’s public spaces,
Young argues, we see glimpses of this ideal: “The city consists in a great diversity
of people and groups, with a multitude of subcultures and differentiated activities
and functions, whose lives and movements mingle and overlap in public spaces.”32
In this vision, there can be community without sameness, shifting affiliations
without ostracism.
This discussion does not, of course, even scratch the surface concerning the
myriad ideas and writings available about the encounter between Self and Other.
Yet, for our purposes, we can at least establish one possible dichotomy that might
be useful. At the most general level, the analyses discussed above suggest that, in
responding to the other, we can pursue at least two possible strategies, which are
very different from each other. We can seek commonality and assume away
perceived difference, or we can acknowledge entrenched difference and attempt to
bridge gaps.
Each of these strategies has its analogue in law. We could assume that in the
encounter with other communities our choices are limited to either full
commonality or complete separation. If so, then in the consideration of non-state
community norms we end up with a debate among the statist and separatist
positions. And we would be forced simply to draw lines between the two. But the
alternative, represented here by Arendt and Young, posits a hybrid reality. Here,
the idea is to build legal structures that foster dialogue across difference,
negotiation without assimilation. Is such a hybrid jurisprudence possible? Let us
see.
II. A JURISPRUDENCE OF HYBRIDITY
Now we turn to explore three possible mechanisms that might form
components of a jurisprudence of hybridity. Each of these mechanisms is premised
on the idea of multiple community affiliation. Therefore, instead of insisting that
one affiliation necessarily trumps the others, we seek ways of fostering dialogue
and mutual accommodation if possible. And if accommodation is not possible, a

30

Young resists using the word “community” because of the “urge to unity” the term
conveys, but acknowledges that “[i]n the end it may be a matter of stipulation whether one
chooses to call . . . [her vision] ‘community.’” Id. at 320; see also Jerry Frug, The
Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1996) (“Unlike Young, I do not
cede the term community to those who evoke the romance of togetherness.”).
31
See Young, supra note 26, at 319 (positing that a group of strangers living side by
side “instantiates social relations as difference in the sense of an understanding of groups
and cultures that are different, with exchanging and overlapping interactions that do not
issue in community, yet which prevent them from being outside of one another”).
32
Id.
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jurisprudence of hybridity at least requires an explanation of why it is impossible
to defer.
A. Margins of Appreciation
One mechanism of accommodation can be drawn from the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR): the oft-discussed “margin of
appreciation” doctrine.33 The idea here is to strike a balance between deference to
national courts and legislators on the one hand, and maintaining “European
supervision” that “empower[s the ECHR] to give the final ruling” on whether a
challenged practice is compatible with the Convention, on the other.34 Thus, the
margin of appreciation allows domestic polities some room to maneuver in
implementing ECHR decisions to accommodate local variation. How big that
margin is depends on a number of factors including, for example, the degree of
consensus among the member states. Thus, in a case involving parental rights of
transsexuals, the ECHR noted that because there was as yet no common European
standard and “generally speaking, the law appears to be in a transitional stage, the
respondent State must be afforded a wide margin of appreciation.”35
Affording this sort of variable margin of appreciation usefully accommodates
a limited range of pluralism. It does not permit domestic courts to fully ignore the
supranational pronouncement (though domestic courts have sometimes asserted
greater independence36). Nevertheless, it does allow space for local variation,
particularly when the law is in transition or when no consensus exists among
member states on a given issue. Moreover, by framing the inquiry as one of local
consensus, the margin of appreciation doctrine disciplines the ECHR and forces it
to move incrementally, pushing towards consensus without running too far ahead
of it. Finally, the margin of appreciation functions as a signaling mechanism
through which “the ECHR is able to identify potentially problematic practices for
the contracting states before they actually become violations, thereby permitting
the states to anticipate that their laws may one day be called into question.”37 And,
33

A particular useful, succinct summary can be found in Laurence R. Helfer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J.
273, 316–17 (1997). My discussion here largely tracks theirs.
34
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 276 (1979).
35
X v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 143, 169 (1997); see also Otto-Preminger
Inst. v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34 (ser. A) at 58 (1995) (finding that the lack of a uniform
European conception of rights to freedom of expression “directed against the religious
feelings of others” dictates a wider margin of appreciation).
36
See, e.g., Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law, 71
MOD. L. REV. 183, 196–97 (2008) (discussing the interaction between the ECHR and state
constitutional courts).
37
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 33, at 317 (citing Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus,
Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133,
141 (1993)) (noting that the Convention “puts other less progressive states on notice that
the laws may no longer be compatible with the Convention if their nationals were to
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of course, there is reverse signaling as well, because domestic states, by their
societal evolution away from consensus, effectively maintain space for local
variation. As Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter have observed, “The
conjunction of the margin of appreciation doctrine and the consensus inquiry thus
permits the ECHR to link its decisions to the pace of change of domestic law,
acknowledging the political sovereignty of respondent states while legitimizing its
own decisions against them.”38 A similar sort of interaction could be established by
a constitutional court adopting some form of the classic concept/conception
distinction39 with regard to the adoption of norms by other actors. Thus, an entity
such as the ECHR could, for example, articulate a particular concept of rights
while recognizing that the way this right is implemented is subject to various
alternative conceptions. Thus, legal regimes could usefully adopt margins of
appreciation with regard to non-state community norms. Such a flexible approach
might allow communities more leeway in trying to make statements of rights work
within a particularized community context.
B. Limited Autonomy Regimes
As noted above, interactions between state and non-state law pose a particular
kind of margin of appreciation issue. Here, as with the supranational/national
dialectic, we have two different normative orders that can neither ignore nor
eliminate the other. Thus, the question becomes what mechanisms of pluralism can
be created to mediate the conflicts? This problem classically arises in the context
of religion or ethnicity, though it is in no way limited to such communities.
Nevertheless, an overview of mechanisms for managing religious and ethnic (or
linguistic-group) hybridity may shed light on the possibility of building institutions
to address non-state normative communities in a variety of settings.
In a useful summary, Henry Steiner has delineated three distinct types of
autonomy regime.40 The first allows a territorially concentrated ethnic, religious, or

challenge them.”). For an example of this type of signaling, see J.G. MERRILLS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 81
(2d ed. 1993) (1986) (interpreting the ECHR’s statement in Rees v. United Kingdom, 106
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1986), that “[t]he need for appropriate legal measures [to
protect transsexuals] should therefore be kept under review having regard particularly to
scientific and societal developments” as a “strong hint that while British practice currently
satisfied [the Convention], the Court’s duty to interpret the Convention as a living
instrument may lead it to a different conclusion in the future.”).
38
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 33, at 317.
39
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 71 (1986) (discussing the difference
between “concept” and “conception” as “a contrast between levels of abstraction at which
the interpretation of the practice can be studied”).
40
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linguistic minority group limited autonomy within the nation-state.41 The precise
contours of this autonomy can vary considerably from situation to situation.
However, such schemes can include the creation of regional elective governments,
command of local police, control over natural resources, management of regional
schools, and so on.42 With regard to language, communities may be empowered to
create language rights within their regions.43
Of course, non-state normative communities are often dispersed throughout a
state, making it difficult to create specific local zones of autonomy.44 In such cases,
other potential autonomy regimes may be more effective.45 A second possibility,
therefore, involves direct power-sharing arrangements.46 “Such regimes carve up a
state’s population in ethnic terms to assure one or several ethnic groups of a
particular form of participation in governance or economic opportunities.”47 Thus,
we may see provisions that set aside a fixed number of legislative seats, executive
branch positions, or judicial appointments to a particular religious or ethnic
minority group.48 In addition, legislators who are members of a particular minority
group may be granted the ability to veto proposed measures adversely affecting
that group.49 Alternatively, states may enact rules requiring formal consultation
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before decisions are taken on issues that particularly impact minority
communities.50
Finally, a third autonomy regime contemplates the reality that members of an
ethnic community may invoke the idea of a personal law that is carried with the
individual, regardless of territorial location. This personal law is often religious in
character, and it reflects a primary identification with one’s religious or ethnic
group, rather than the territorially delimited community of the nation-state.51
Accordingly, state law may seek to create what are essentially margins of
appreciation to recognize forms of autonomy for these identities.52 “Like power
sharing, a personal law can provide an important degree of autonomy and cohesion
even for minorities that are territorially dispersed.”53
The question of accommodation to personal law is not a new one, nor is it
limited to religious groups. In ancient Egypt, foreign merchants in commercial
disputes were sometimes permitted to choose judges of their own nationality so
foreigners could settle their dispute “in accordance with their own foreign laws and
customs.”54 Greek city-states adopted similar rules.55 Later, legal systems in
England and continental Europe applied personal law to foreign litigants, judging
many criminal and civil matters based not on the territorial location of the actors,
but on their citizenship.56 In the ninth century, for example, King Edgar allowed
Danes to be judged by the laws of their homeland.57 Likewise, William the
Conqueror granted eleventh-century French immigrants the right to be judged by
rules based on their national identity.58 Foreign merchants trading under King
John, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, were similarly governed by the law of
their home communities.59
As noted previously, the relationship between state and personal law
frequently arose in colonial settings where western legal systems were layered on
top of the personal laws and customs of indigenous communities. Indeed, in the
colonial context, margins of appreciation and other forms of accommodation were
50
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often invoked as governing legal principles. For example, English courts were
empowered to exercise the jurisdiction of the English courts of law and chancery
only “as far as circumstances [would] admit.”60 Likewise, with respect to personal
laws, the Straits Settlements Charter of 1855 allowed the courts of judicature to
exercise jurisdiction as an ecclesiastical court “so far as the religions, manners and
customs of the inhabitants admit.”61 “By the end of the colonial era, indigenous
law was recognized as law proper by all the colonial powers.”62
Today, particularly in countries with a large minority Muslim population,
many states maintain space for personal law within a nominally Westphalian legal
structure. These nation-states—ranging from Canada to the United Kingdom to
Egypt to India to Singapore—recognize parallel civil and religious legal systems,
often with their own separate courts.63 And civil legal authorities are frequently
called on to determine the margin of appreciation to be given to such personal law.
For example, the Indian Supreme Court has famously attempted to bridge secular
and Islamic law in two decisions involving Muslim women’s right to maintenance
after divorce.64 At the same time, issues arise concerning the extent to which
members of a particular religious or ethnic community can opt out of their personal
law and adopt the law of the nation-state. For example, in 1988 a Sri Lankan court
decided that a Muslim couple could adopt a child according to state regulation but
could not confer inheritance rights on their adopted child because Islamic Law did
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not recognize adoption.65 Even outside of the context of Islamic law, the United
States Supreme Court has at times deferred to the independent parallel courts
maintained by Indian populations located within U.S. territorial borders.66 And
beyond judicial bodies, we will increasingly see other governmental entities, such
as banking regulators, forced to oversee forms of financing that conform to
religious principles.67 These sorts of negotiations, like all the limited autonomy
regimes surveyed in this section, reflect official recognition of essential hybridity
that the state cannot wish away.
C. Conflicts of Laws
Because non-state lawmaking is not usually conceived of as law, we do not
usually think of clashes between state and non-state law through the prism of
conflicts of law jurisprudence. But we could. Indeed, the three classic legal
doctrines often grouped together under the rubric of conflict of laws—jurisdiction,
choice of law, and judgment recognition—are specifically meant to manage hybrid
legal spaces. However, although these doctrines are where one would most expect
to see creative innovations springing forth to address hybridity, they have only
infrequently been used in this way. Thus, it may be helpful to consider how
communities could use choice-of-law and judgment recognition doctrines to
manage the reality of multiple community affiliation.
To illustrate, I explore two well-known cases in which the U.S. Supreme
Court was forced to determine how state-based lawmaking would interact with the
norms of a religious community. First, in Bob Jones University v. United States,
the Court addressed an IRS decision to deny tax-exempt status to a religious school
that interpreted Christian scriptures to forbid “interracial dating and marriage.”68
Second, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, the question was whether a general state statute forbidding certain narcotics
should be applied to an Indian tribe’s religious practice that included the use of
peyote.69 To my mind, viewing these conflicts as choice-of-law questions makes
the analytical framework more coherent (though, it should be noted, no less
difficult).
Turning to Bob Jones, the Internal Revenue Service had interpreted Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which gives tax-exempt status to
qualifying charitable institutions, to apply to schools only if such schools have a
“racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students.”70 Accordingly, the Service
denied tax exemption to Bob Jones University, which had not admitted blacks at
65
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all until 1971, and had admitted them thereafter but had forbidden interracial
dating, interracial marriage, the espousal of violation of these prohibitions, and
membership in groups that advocated interracial marriage.71 Crucial to the case
was the fact that the university grounded its rule not on racial attitudes, but on
Biblical scripture. The school therefore considered the exclusion of interracial
dating to be a principal tenet of its religious community.72 Nevertheless, although
the text of section 501(c)(3) did not speak to racial discrimination at all, the
Supreme Court upheld the IRS determination, finding the service’s interpretation
of the code provision to be permissible.73
Robert Cover, in his article Nomos and Narrative, has famously criticized the
reasoning of the Bob Jones decision, even while agreeing with the Court’s result.
According to Cover, the Court assumed “a position that places nothing at risk and
from which the Court makes no interpretive gesture at all, save the quintessential
gesture to the jurisdictional canons: the statement that an exercise of political
authority was not unconstitutional.”74 In particular, Cover argued that, by
grounding its decision on an interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, the Court
had sidestepped the crucial constitutional question of whether Congress could
grant tax exemptions to schools that discriminated on the basis of race.75 This was
a problem for Cover because he believed that if a state legal authority were going
to “kill off” the competing normative commitment of an alternative community, it
should do so based on a profound normative commitment of its own.76 By avoiding
the constitutional question, Cover complained, the Court had disserved both the
religious community—whose normative commitments would be placed at the
mercy of mere public policy judgments—and disserved racial minorities—who
“deserved a constitutional commitment to avoiding public subsidization of
racism.”77
In contrast, had the clash between the university’s religious rule and the IRS
code, or between the religious rule and the United States Constitution, been viewed
as a choice-of-law decision, two aspects of the case would have been clarified.
First, the Court would have analyzed and defined the relevant community
affiliations at stake. Second, the Court would have been forced to grapple with the
strength of its commitment to the principle of nondiscrimination, just as Cover
urged. As a result, instead of simply asserting federal law, a conflicts analysis
encourages negotiation among the different norms advanced by different
communities.
A more cosmopolitan and pluralist vision of conflict of laws recognizes that
people and groups hold multiple community affiliations and takes those affiliations
seriously. Thus, when a non-state legal practice is largely internal and primarily
71
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reflects individuals’ affiliation with the non-state community, the practice should
be given more leeway than when the state itself is part of the relevant affiliation. In
this case, the issue at stake was a tax exemption, a quintessentially state matter.
Indeed, Bob Jones University was asking for a particular benefit for charitable
organizations that was contained in the United States tax code. Therefore, for these
purposes the place of the university within the nation-state was the most salient tie,
making application of the federal law more justifiable. In contrast, as we shall see,
other non-state normative commitments do not implicate the nation-state so
directly.
Moreover, even if the relevant community tie were largely with the religious
community itself, certain norms might be held so strongly by the nation-state
community that such norms would be applied regardless of the community
affiliation. In choice-of-law analysis, this is usually called the public policy
exception, and it allows courts to refuse to apply foreign law that would otherwise
apply, if those legal norms are sufficiently repugnant. However, as noted
previously, application of the public policy exception is rare, both as a normative
and descriptive matter. Thus, if a court asserts such an exception, it must justify the
use of public policy grounds by reference to precisely the sorts of deeply held
commitments that Cover envisioned. In the Bob Jones case, for example, it might
be that the nation-state’s deep commitment to eradicating racial discrimination
would independently justify overriding the religious norms, regardless of the
community affiliation analysis.
Accordingly, a conflicts approach would not simply throw the claim of
protected religious insularity to the mercy of political or bureaucratic judgments.
Taking the ban on interracial dating seriously as law and performing a choice-oflaw analysis would create the obligation to engage in crucial line drawing. And
although the community affiliation and public policy exception analyses in this
case might justify application of state law, that will not always be the case.
Consider, by way of contrast, Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, in which the Supreme Court refused to extend First
Amendment protection to the religious use of peyote.78 There, unlike the tax
exemption at issue in Bob Jones, the Indian tribe was not negotiating its
relationship with the state; rather the use of peyote was part of a purely internal
religious practice open primarily (or exclusively) to members of that community.
Thus, a choice-of-law analysis based on community affiliation might well result in
deference to the non-state norm. Moreover, the normative commitment to drug
enforcement is perhaps better characterized as a governance choice than as an
inexorable normative command. As such, the public policy exception is arguably
less appropriate in this context than when addressing racial discrimination.
Applying these principles, a choice-of-law analysis might well have permitted the
religious practice in Smith.
In the end, however, I am less concerned with the particular outcome than
with the analytical framework. Conceiving of these clashes between religious and
78
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state-based norms in conflicts terms reorients the inquiry in a way that takes more
seriously the non-state community assertion. As a result, courts must wrestle both
with the nature of the multiple community affiliations potentially at issue and with
the need to articulate truly strong normative justifications for not deferring to the
non-state norm. Both consequences make the choice-of-law decision a constructive
terrain of engagement among multiple normative systems, rather than an arm of
state government imposing its normative vision on all within its coercive power.
Of course, this vision is not unproblematic. Two related objections
immediately present themselves. First, a choice-of-law rule that tends to defer to
non-state norms when they implicate only internal community affiliation might be
seen to rest on the often-criticized distinction between public and private action.
Indeed, the idea of deference in this context might come to look like the classic
state deference to family privacy or autonomy.79 And just as family privacy was
often invoked to shield domestic violence and gender hierarchy, so too may
deference to “internal” community norms become deference to fundamentally
illiberal norms.
Second, as in the family context, we may make a mistake by assuming that
the non-state community at issue is monolithic. Indeed, it may be that some
members of the relevant community would prefer to have the state norm applied to
their situation. As Judith Resnik has noted, Cover’s vision of multiple normgenerating communities did not address the problem of conflict “within [such]
communities about their own practices and authoritative interpretations.”80 Yet,
such “contestation from within”81 (which is likely to occur along the fault lines of
power hierarchies within the community) is an almost inevitable part of
community norm creation. Thus, the choice-of-law question becomes, in part, a
question of whose voices within a community are heard by which speakers of
nation-state power.
As to the concern that too much deference to “private” norms within a
community will overly empower illiberal communities, it is important to remember
that, because of the public policy exception, these norms, if sufficiently abhorrent,
need not be applied by the state authority. After all, a lynch mob may also be a
statement of community norms, but it need not for that reason necessarily be
embraced. The object of a choice-of-law analysis is not to blindly follow non-state
community norms, but to ensure that if a state asserts its own norms it does so selfconsciously. Indeed, simply identifying the state’s jurispathic power does not
necessarily mean that we must reject all exercises of that power.82 Even Cover
recognized the utility of a state court’s speaking in “imperial mode.”83 He noted
that, when judges kill off competing law by asserting that “this one is law,” they
79
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may do violence to the competing visions, but they also enable peace both because
too much law is too chaotic to sustain and because some laws are simply too
noxious to be applied.84 The point then is simply to make sure that the imposition
of imperial, jurispathic law is not done blindly or arrogantly, but with
intentionality and a respect for the other sources of law-making that are being
displaced.85 A conflicts analysis at least opens space for such self-consciousness
and care.
More difficult is the problem of how to respond to Resnik’s arguments about
inevitable conflicts within a non-state community concerning the content of that
community’s norms. Certainly the existence of significant disagreement within the
community might be factored into the decision of whether to apply the state norm.
Thus, if some substantial portion of the non-state community were clamoring for
the application of state law, such clamoring might blunt somewhat the need to
defer to the non-state norm.
More important, in thinking about how to address disputes within a non-state
community, we must distinguish between two types of challenges. One concerns
the proper understanding of what the content of the community’s law actually is,
and the other concerns what that law ought to be. For example, in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, a woman who was a member of an Indian tribe challenged her
tribe’s refusal to consider her children to be tribal members.86 She did so, however,
not based on an argument that the tribe had improperly interpreted its own
community law (which based tribal membership on the father’s tribal membership,
not the mother’s). Instead, she argued that the tribe’s law was inconsistent with a
federal equal protection statute.87 Thus, the case did not present a contestation
about the content of the community’s norms; it merely raised a choice-of-law issue
about whether the tribal law or the federal statute should govern. And however
difficult the resolution of that choice-of-law question might be, it does not raise the
conundrum of how to determine the appropriate content of the non-state norms in
the first place.
Finally, in those relatively infrequent situations when the actual content of the
non-state norm is at issue, courts can seek evidence to determine that community’s
governing norm. Historical documentation, anthropological testimony, and
evidence of ongoing practice might all be relevant. And again, to the extent that
there are concerns that the non-state norm is the product of hierarchy, those
concerns can be factored into the choice-of-law inquiry itself; they do not render it
impossible to determine the content of the norm.
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CONCLUSION
A jurisprudence of hybridity does not, of course, make it any easier to reach
actual decisions in individual cases. Indeed, determining when to defer to a nonstate norm and when not, when to allow a margin of appreciation and when to
insist on a state norm, when to carve out zones of autonomy and when to encroach
on them—these are all issues that are probably impossible ever to resolve
satisfactorily. And I do not suggest that merely adopting a more inclusive set of
jurisprudential or institutional mechanisms will eliminate clashes between state
and non-state normative communities. Such clashes are both inevitable and
unlikely ever to be dissolved.
But the relevant question, it seems to me, is not whether law can eliminate
conflict, but whether it has a chance of mediating disputes among multiple
communities. And this question becomes increasingly important as normative
communities increasingly overlap and intersect. Accordingly, instead of
bemoaning the messiness of jurisdictional overlaps, we should accept them as a
necessary consequence of the fact that communities cannot be hermetically sealed
off from each other. Moreover, we can go further and consider the possibility that
this jurisdictional messiness might, in the end, provide important systemic benefits
by fostering dialogue among multiple constituencies, authorities, levels of
government, and non-state communities. In addition, jurisdictional redundancy
allows alternative ports of entry for strategic actors who might otherwise be
silenced.
Most fundamentally, all of this interaction is elided or ignored if we continue
to think and speak as if legal and quasi-legal spheres can be formally differentiated
from each other. Instead, we need to accept and perhaps even celebrate, the
potentially jurisgenerative and creative role law might play in a plural world.
Indeed, it is only if we take multiple affiliation seriously, if we seek dialogue
across difference, if we accept unassimilated otherness, that we will have some
hope of navigating the hybrid legal spaces that are all around us.

